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Abstract
With the demise of the Colombian cartels in the late 1980s, a new business paradigm has
emerged in Colombia and other Latin American countries. Throughout the last several decades,
numerous political, social, and economic factors have aided in the emergence and growth of this
new illicit venture. Internally, illicit ventures are shaped by the state’s increased dependence on
the illicit drug trade, a shift in societal acceptance of the ventures, the nature of Colombian
culture, and a lack of opportunity in the legal economy. Externally, these ventures are shaped by
increased foreign political pressure from the United States as well as economic globalization.
These factors have aided in the emergence and development of these ventures, resulting in the
ventures being increasingly more integrated economically, socially, and politically. I argue that
these external and internal factors of Colombia’s environment have shaped new illicit business
paradigms that, in practice, share many similarities to legal business paradigms. These ventures
are similar to legal businesses in countries that are characterized by these particular external and
internal factors.

Introduction
Much of the narrative that surrounds illicit ventures portrays a sensationalist view of extreme
violence, corruption, and crime. Each day, mass media provides a commentary on the drug wars in
Colombia, Mexico, and many other Latin American countries that perpetuates the same global
response. This narrative and response exposes the inability of many to fully understand these illicit
ventures. The ventures’ aim is simple but their organization is complex, focusing on supplying a
very lucrative and high margin product to their customers. The demand for drugs remains
dangerously high; the 230 million global drug users provide the ventures with a seemingly infinite
number of customers. (Buggle, 2013, para. 9). To keep up with this demand, many illicit ventures
are utilizing business paradigms similar to those of legal, multinational corporations. These
standard business practices are merely adapted to fit their illicit product. As countries see a shift in
the political, economic, and social landscapes, illicit ventures must further alter their business
practices.
Colombian drug trafficking emerged as a powerful strength with the development of the
marijuana drug trade in the mid 1970s. By the 1980s, two large cocaine cartels grew out of the
success of the marijuana trade. They then took a much more integrated role within Colombia and
were making a profit similar to that of a number of multinational companies (Canales, 2013). The
cartels’ size and structure required much of the same organization and practices of these same
large corporations. After the cartels’ collapse in the early 1990s, smaller, more decentralized drug
ventures emerged. Many of the new illicit ventures used the same paradigms of their predecessors,
with some adaptation due to shifts in the internal and external environment. As they developed,
these new ventures began to appear even more akin to legal businesses than the cartels had been.
Because of this, I seek to explore what social, economic, and political factors have shaped the new
business paradigm that is seen in these new illicit ventures.
Through the examination of these political, social, and economic factors, I determined that
there are six internal and external forces that aided in the emergence and development of the illicit
ventures seen today. Focusing internally, the dependence of the government on the drug trade, the
social shift in attitude towards the industry, the nature of Colombian culture, and the lack of ample
opportunities in the legal economy all have helped shape the paradigms of illicit drug ventures.
Externally, increased foreign political pressure on Colombia and economic globalization have
aided in shaping these ventures as well. Based on this analysis, I argue that these external and
internal factors of Colombia’s environment have shaped new illicit business paradigms that, in
practice, share many similarities to legal business paradigms. Despite the present narrative that
these ventures are merely simple and violent organizations, they are in fact very similar to legal
businesses in countries that are characterized by these particular external and internal factors.
The role of the illicit economy in the global political economy
Defined as the relationship between states and international illegal markets, the illicit economy is
an extremely prevalent and integrated part of the global political economy. Known by numerous
names (shadow, hidden, black, underground, gray, clandestine, illegal, and parallel), this economy
consists of undetected economic activities that are not recorded in national income reports
(Fleming et al., 2000). There are numerous illicit activities including arms trafficking, human
smuggling, organ trafficking, wildlife trafficking, piracy, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting
(“Havocscope”, 2013). Specifically in Colombia, the list of illicit activities includes cocaine
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production, manufacturing counterfeit U.S. dollars, producing (and using) assassins for hire, the
export of prostitution in Latin America, and producing high quality counterfeit documents, pirated
software and CDs (Thoumi, 2005).
States ultimately have the capacity to define which activities are illicit, as the mere
existence and enforcement of governmental controls are the drivers of innovation in these
activities. Illicit ventures consistently have to improve their systems and business models to be
able to evade state controls and enforcement in their industry (Andreas, 2004). In addition, some
states have neglected to provide adequate and appropriate regulatory framework for legal
businesses, which has provided an entry point for legal businesses to enter into partnerships with
illicit ventures through areas such as money laundering and business fronts (Zeidler, 2011).
Currently, many states that have previously struggled with defining boundaries and preventing the
growth of illicit activities have reinstated their power through more expansive, comprehensive,
and technological innovation; this has greatly aided in regulation efforts of the illicit economy
(Andreas, 2004).
States are unable to tax illicit activity causing state tax revenue to be much lower than it
should be. Thus, the illicit economy limits the state’s ability to provide its citizens with the public
goods their citizens need (Fleming et al., 2000). Bribery and corruption often run rampant
throughout political institutions in countries with a large illicit economy, with states sometimes
looking to illicit activity to provide state revenue. Low salaries paid to government workers and
law enforcement agents often cause many to look elsewhere for payments, such as bribery from
illicit activity (LeoGrande & Sharpe, 2000). Specifically in Mexico, the state’s legal economic
instability often leads to the state relying on illicit revenue to fund state activity (Andreas, 1998;
Vellinga, 2004).
The social, political, and legal characteristics of a country help to shape the composition
and size of their illicit economies, which causes certain countries to be more susceptible to illicit
activity. Developing countries, such as Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Brazil and
Paraguay, greatly rely on the informal sector for employment and productivity. Between 1990 and
1994, the illicit economy in these countries was 25-35 percent of these states’ productivity
(Fleming et al., 2000, p. 405-406). However, with its clandestine nature, the illicit economy is
extremely difficult to measure because of unreliable and undocumented data. It has been estimated
by Havocscope, a leading provider of black market data and information, that the illicit economy
today is worth over $1.79 trillion, with the drug trade being over $500 billion of that total number
(“Havocscope”, 2013; Andreas, 2004)1. Even with a lower estimate of $100 billion in the drug
trade industry, it would still be one of the leading industries in the international economy
(Andreas, 2004).
The nature of drug trafficking
Countries can participate in drug trafficking in three ways: production, trans-shipment, and
targeted consumption (Singer, 2008). Colombia acts as a country of production, which then
1

Statement from Havocscope, LLC: “The Havocscope World Black Market Value is the estimated value of the illegal
black market. This figure is calculated by combining the total value of 50 global security threats along total value of
illegal networks and markets in 91 countries. The total impact values from both the security threats and country
markets are added together and divided by 2 in order to produce the estimated value of the black market.”
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transships through numerous countries in Latin America and West Africa to target its main
consumption areas of the United States and Europe. In 1993, over 23 percent of Colombia’s GNP
came from the drug trade and 2.5 to 2.7 million people in Latin America relied on drug production
for employment. Often the production and distribution of drugs provide a very similar
socioeconomic structure within the country of that established by legal industries, particularly
agribusiness (Salazar & Fierro, 1993, p. 87; Zabludoff, 1997).
There are several key aspects that make a country particularly susceptible to the growth of
drug trafficking. The legitimacy of the state, the existence of ample opportunities within an active
national economy, societal acceptance of the drug trade, and pre-existing civil conflict are keys to
the development of the drug industry within a country (Bybee, 2011). The Andean region,
specifically Colombia, has seen huge growth in drug trafficking over several decades. Aiding in
this growth is the government’s inability to remain accountable to citizens, fight corruption, and
exert state power over large geographic areas (Vellinga, 2004). Colombia is split by three
mountain ranges, with the easternmost range containing half of the total land in Colombia. Fourfifths of Colombians live in the western region (McLean, 2002). The government does not have
the resources to effectively combat these geographic and social challenges, and ultimately has lost
the state’s legitimacy and accountability. Without state power in these regions, drug traffickers are
able to take over and provide Colombians with economic growth, employment, and public goods
(McLean, 2002; Thoumi, 2005; Vellinga, 2004).
When drug trafficking initially emerged in the 1980s, the economic benefits it generated
caused many Colombians to view its growth as positive (Hartlyn, 1993). The legal economy was
not able to provide the employment opportunities that the illicit economy was able to provide
Colombians (Fleming et al., 2000). Today over 300,000 Colombians work within the drug
industry and roughly the same number of Mexicans are growing drug crops in Mexico (Andreas,
1998, p. 160; Podur, 2003, para. 5). Individuals involved in any aspect of the supply chain now
rely on drug trafficking for their economic livelihood and have come to accept the violence of the
industry as a social norm (Whiteford, 2002).
The theory of constructivism helps to explain the role that history and norms have played
in establishing and promoting the drug trade. It examines the idea that society and political actors
are merely adhering to the social rules and norms that society has established (Balaam & Dillman,
2011). The lack of state power, geographic challenges, and a history of civil violence in Colombia
caused the establishment of the drug trade as a norm in society. Without any sense of social
cohesion or national identity, factions within society appeared and the government began
promoting a zero-sum partisanship, leaving society to deal with and accept the violence that
followed. As drug cartels began integrating themselves into society and political institutions, they
were able to provide the resources and economic stability that the government could not (Brysk,
2009). The head of the Medellin cartel, Pablo Escobar, held a political office, provided housing for
the extreme poor, and built soccer pitches throughout his community (Zimbalist et al., 2010). The
violence continued, but society began to look at these drug lords as legitimate leaders who
provided a logical narrative that allowed society to accept drug trafficking as a norm and a part of
their society (Brysk, 2009).
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Historically, violence and civil conflict in Colombia existed before the emergence of the
drug trade, during a period of civil conflict known as La Violencia from 1947 to 1958 (Millet,
2002). This period of time is seen to have destroyed social capital within Colombia and aided in
the increased regionalism of the country with a large migration from rural to urban (Brysk, 2009;
Thoumi & Windybank, 2007). Initially, the primary cause for violence was the uneven distribution
of resources, particularly land, that the government had failed to address. Drug traffickers bought
large sections of land and guerrilla groups began to set up their own form of land reform. These
groups then built roads and schools, and contributed to political campaigns. Under a government
that did little to help society, criminal groups were the ones to provide the needed resources to the
communities they operated in. This community support from the drug traffickers has caused many
Colombians to endure and accept this way of life (Whiteford, 2002). This social acceptance of the
drug trade, the state’s ineffective combative methods and historical civil violence has shaped a
new social reality that effectively allows drug production and trade to be a norm within society
(Pankratz & Matiasek, 2011).
Components of business paradigms
Defined as a clear example, model, or pattern in business, business paradigms often provide the
precedence that companies rely on to implement business practices that will help them grow. More
often than not, these paradigms can shift to respond to a change in the external or internal
environment that the business operates in. Businesses confront these challenges on a daily basis;
some being so radically different than the norm that a new model is needed to establish new
strategies and management practices. As mentioned earlier, illicit ventures use business paradigms
and practices that legal businesses rely on to operate in the legal economy. The illicit nature of
their product often forces many to adapt these paradigms for an illicit context.
Business paradigms in an illicit context
The capitalist mode of production has ultimately turned drugs into a new, extremely profitable
commodity that attracts many entrepreneurs (Salazar & Fierro, 1993). Many of these entrepreneurs
pursue a profit from this illicit commodity using similar, yet slightly different business practices
than a legal business would use. Due to the illicit nature of the product, many use a mix of legal
and illegal business practices that allows them to continue the growth of their venture. Since they
are operating outside boundaries of formal institutions, they use illegal methods to overcome and
deal with issues outside of legal boundaries (Singer, 2008; Webb et al., 2009). Areas of business
like conflict management cannot be dealt with formally due to the illegality of the business, fair
prices not being government set, and mediation of drug related problems not being taken
seriously. Due to little government arbitration or formal boundaries, illegal and informal measures
are used to settle conflicts (Jacques & Wright, 2011).
Similar to legal entrepreneurs, illicit entrepreneurs are motivated by profit and have the
same desires as their legal counterparts. They have a heightened desire for wealth, are comfortable
risk-takers, and are extremely competent in their chosen field (Smith, 2009). Before becoming an
entrepreneur or head of an illicit venture, many are trained by high-level people within their fields,
reflecting the structure of an internship or mentorship (Vannostrand, 1999). They are able to learn
each aspect of the trade that enables them to move up in the business once their mentor trusts
them. Many of these entrepreneurs typically obtain ownership over their illicit venture by
exploiting opportunities in the market (as was seen in the establishment of Colombian cartels),
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exploiting connections with people already in the drug trade, or obtaining ownership through
succession and promotion (Brice, 2003; Vannostrand, 1999).
An illicit entrepreneur’s focus on growth ventures often means that he follows the standard
and legal entrepreneurial process to build a business (Zabludoff, 1997). This process is broken
down into the stages of 1) entrepreneurial alertness, 2) opportunity recognition, 3) opportunity
exploitation, and 4) decisions concerning growth. Just as an entrepreneur in a legal business would
be alert to opportunities, illicit entrepreneurs are able to recognize opportunities and begin their
business based off growth decisions. Opportunity recognition can occur spontaneously with an
idea brought on as a flash of insight. The entrepreneur will then exploit opportunities by
leveraging new and existing resources to establish more effective processes. For drug
entrepreneurs, this could be exploiting, or even taking over, existing networks or distribution
channels. Lastly, entrepreneurs will make decisions that will allow their venture to grow. This
could include sustaining their business in existing markets while also leveraging opportunities in
new markets (Webb et al., 2009). More than likely every legal sector has an illicit counterpart
that entrepreneurs can thus recognize and then exploit (Andreas, 2004).
The business model of an illicit venture
A standard business model consists of four main components: customer value proposition (CVP),
profit formula, key resources, and key activities. This same business model, which is commonly
used in licit ventures, can effectively be applied to illicit ventures. The customer value proposition
consists of the value transfer that occurs from dealer to customers. As drugs are highly addictive in
nature, much of the value is perceived as the high that the customer receives from the provided
drugs (Kurrle, 2013). The United States accounts for more than half of the global demand for
drugs, resulting in a relatively consistent demand that has shown great profits (Canales, 2013).
However, illicit ventures are always looking for unfilled demand that they can cater. There is no
customer loyalty to a certain drug venture, as customers will seek the most easily accessible or
cheapest drug they can find. Because of this, many illicit ventures unleash extreme violence to kill
off competition for control of the border, markets, raw materials, and distribution of the product
(Kurrle, 2013; Salazar & Fierro, 1993). Much of the territorial battles that occur in Mexico stem
from the major cartels competing for dominance in the industry as well as the drug routes into the
United States (Khan, 2013).
The profit formula is much more difficult to accurately depict due to the lack of public
financial statements and cash transactions. Profit margins are enormous: one transport of a
delivery across the border provides a steep increase in their profit margin. The expense of losing a
shipment is merely the cost of doing business. Entrepreneurs follow the principle ‘with high risk
comes high reward’ and it often pays off if they are willing to take the risk. As it stands today,
Mexican and Colombian cartels have raked in a profit of $4.6 billion just from exporting to the
United States (Badkar, 2011, slide 4). Expenses also consist of the cost of paying their employees,
their subcontractors and bribes. Venture capital is also seen in illicit enterprises as they look to
invest in and provide capital for an external firm to do research and development. This is
extremely necessary for the venture to stay ahead of its competition and increased policing efforts
(Kurrle, 2013).
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An illicit venture’s key resources are vital for their survival and key to their business
model. People are a huge resource, and somewhat of a liability, to these ventures. They generally
have been trained through first hand experience, which allows them to fully understand the
networks that surround the business. The venture can combat any risk of disloyalty by stressing a
culture of trust, secrecy, and loyalty while also promoting a reputation of violence that is known
within their network and community. In the enterprise, this culture is held in high regard and is
both extremely important to the fellow employees as well as the leaders of the venture. Trust must
be established between the venture and the workers, as this will reduce the likelihood that, if
caught by law enforcement, they will give up information (Kurrle, 2013). Similar to legal
businesses, trust is gained through business processes such as following through on agreements. In
order to minimize risk, avoid detection, and neutralize competition, secrecy is used by the venture
to protect their business and its people. Without traditional marketing methods, keeping
information on contacts, partners, markets, and clients a secret is vital to gain an edge over
competition. An illicit venture’s reputation is often built off of violence or the discourse that
surrounds them (Kurrle, 2013; Zaitch, 2005). Violence is often used not only as a reputation
builder but also as a resource to enforce deals, resolve conflicts, and threaten competitors and law
enforcement (Singer, 2008; Zaitch, 2005).
Their processes heavily depend on the bribery and extortion on key players within their
industry. These can be law enforcement officials who, in Mexico, fight over major smuggling
routes for the bigger bribes or prominent government officials that are threatened, assassinated, or
bribed to reverse or lobby for legislation (Andreas, 1998; Kurrle, 2013). They also rely heavily on
intelligence for the surveillance of all their operations, which require precision and careful
planning (Kurrle, 2013). Efficiency and effectiveness greatly depend on their ability to acquire
intelligence that will aid in anticipating advanced and updated policing efforts (Williams, 1998).
The structure of an illicit venture
The constantly changing environment requires drug ventures to be highly flexible and promote
redundancy in their supply base and product to operate. If for any reason their networks are
compromised, they are flexible enough that they can alter their shape and have enough redundancy
built in so that they can still operate and supply their product to their consumers. The threat of
enforcement, disloyal employees that give away trade secrets, and competition forces ventures to
rely heavily on networks within their core and periphery networks (Williams, 1998).
The core is composed of a dense network of connected individuals that lead the entire
organization. Entry into the core largely depends on the level of trust that one has within the
organization. The core remains autonomous and directive of the periphery (Zabludoff, 1997).
Generally, with a top leader that handles major decisions, the core is connected and bonded by
high levels of trust, which is critical for the sustainability of the operation (Williams, 1998;
Zabludoff, 1997). Similar to CEOs of large, legal businesses, the leadership of an illicit venture
must consist of quick decision-makers that are highly flexible in making changes. Leaders of illicit
ventures are not afraid to use violence to establish dominance and power. They oversee all day-today operations and consistently try to reduce all business risk within their operations (Zabludoff,
1997).
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The periphery is made up of essential employees that have much looser relationships.
Depending on the size of the organization, this can consist of 100-200 people with over 100
subcontractors that specialize in specific functions throughout the organization (Lopez et al.,
2001). For many Mexican cartels, they are known to employ at least half a million people (Khan,
2013). Similar to a large corporation, the venture will often employ legal lawyers, economists, and
other financial experts that can provide wealth management within their periphery (Lopez et al.,
2001). New people are constantly brought into the industry to increase the reach of the venture
and grow their activities while reducing the risk of day-to-day operations (Williams, 1998;
Zabludoff, 1997). Each part of the periphery only knows the information that is needed for their
operations, which often causes many employees to feel less connected or bonded to the
organization (Kurrle, 2013). As these ventures amass a greater amount of profit and grow, the
scope of the periphery increases (Lopez et al., 2001).
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and investment
Many of the drug cartels in the 1980s and drug entrepreneurs today invest some of their profits
locally, whether it is for their own economic interests or for community improvement. Regardless
of the intent of their investments, their money is injected into the economy, which helps to
improve the economy while often improving the lives of thousands. A large share of their
investments is used to acquire property and businesses in Colombia (Zabludoff, 1997). As
discussed earlier, Pablo Escobar invested in the community through housing projects for the poor,
improving soccer field conditions, and other endeavors that improved the lives of Colombia’s
most poor (Vellinga, 2004; Zimbalist et al., 2010). Some Mexican cartels organize community
events such as picnics and barbecues (Khan, 2013). The relationship that is built between an
illegal business and the community is very important due in large part on the venture’s
dependence on society for resources as well as its legitimacy (Brice, 2003). Through this corporate
social responsibility, the Medellin cartel had the backing of some of the nation’s poorest
neighborhoods and was ultimately able to gain legitimacy from the community (Zimbalist et al.,
2010). Conversely, the Cali cartel extended their economic prowess through the construction and
operation of 432 drugstores. In addition, they owned hotels, supermarkets, banks and credit
institutions, radio stations, soccer clubs, airlines, and labs that went towards the betterment of
society and economic strength as they invested in legal businesses (Vellinga, 2004).
Illicit entrepreneurs today in Colombia have a much lower profile within society, but they
still invest in the legal economy by extending their business into society through contracting
services of legal businesses. These services can include transportation, security, banking,
communication, investment and legal assistance, and, perhaps the most controversial, money
laundering (Andreas, 1998; Vellinga, 2004). For products sold in the United States, the drug
traffickers must convert the huge sum of U.S. dollars to pesos without detection. Often, many
legal banks are involved in this transaction (especially U.S. banks), whether the bank is aware of it
or not. Colombian traffickers have been known to utilize the legal services of banks in Colombia,
the United States, and Mexico to launder their money. HSBC in Mexico recently was exposed
after a drug lord claimed the bank to be “the place to launder money” (“HSBC”, 2012). As they
strive to blend in more with mainstream society, these ventures take part in legal and illegal
transactions and businesses, which makes it difficult to isolate illicit transactions and distinguish
business fronts from legitimate businesses (Zabludoff, 1997).
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The shift in the illicit business paradigm
The Colombian drug trade rapidly emerged in 1975 with the marijuana trade and the coffee boom.
Mexico was undergoing major interdiction efforts that opened the door for Colombia to take over
70 percent of the market share of the marijuana going into the United States (Garavito, 2013). This
along with the Colombian coffee boom led to an influx in foreign exchange that poured into the
economy causing inflation to rise. To address this crisis, the president at the time, Lopez
Michelsen, declared a state of economic emergency in order to pass measures that would stabilize
the economy. This included significantly cutting public investment and social welfare programs.
These measures, in addition to several other austere ones, did little to help; they merely widened
the income gap and established a great dissent towards the government (Butler, 1999). While the
coffee boom did not continue, the drug trade flourished. It had endured the economic crisis and
brought about continued economic growth. The initial growth in the mid to late 1970s established
support for the drug trade among several factions of society, especially growers in rural areas
(Hartlyn, 1993). The wealthier the drug cartels became, the more money they would invest in the
economy and the community. One example of this improvement occurred with the construction of
buildings, both residential and commercial, by the cartels. This construction would provide jobs to
community members as well as build residences and office space for locals. The height of wealth
for the cartels in the early to mid 1980s was a time that the illicit economy actually benefited more
Colombians than the legal economy (Garavito, 2013).
The era of the cartels and the drug lords began in the early 1980s. The country was run by
two main cartels, both headed by Colombian drug lords that had earned a large majority of their
money from the marijuana trade. The Medellin cartel, run by Pablo Escobar, and the Cali cartel
had since diversified their product and began to control more than 70 percent of the Colombian
cocaine exports by the mid 1980s (López et al., 2001p. 15). The Medellin cartel unleashed
extreme violence to gain control of the industry, the state and its people, often using the threat
plata o plomo (silver or lead) to establish corruption among various ranks in the state (McLean,
2002; Vellinga, 2004). This corruption ran rampant as many accepted bribes out of fear of
assassination by Escobar. The judicial system was torn apart as many judges were killed after the
sentencing of various drug traffickers within the cartels. It was this corruption and fear within the
government that ultimately caused the deterioration of many Colombian institutions and state
sovereignty, allowing further growth of the drug trade (McLean, 2002).
By the early 1990s, more threats came from the United States government to end the
cartels’ control of Colombia. The Colombian government began to strike back against the cartels,
but not yet with the purpose of destroying them. The differing goals of the United States and
Colombian governments created tension between the two countries (Friman & Andreas, 1999).
With the threat of being extradited, Escobar took advantage of this tension and lobbied to pass
legislation banning extradition in 1991. He killed anyone that blocked him and eventually had the
President change the Constitution so that no one could be extradited to the United States
(Zimbalist et al., 2010). However, as the pressure from the United States continued and the
Colombian government continued to fail to respond to public problems, violent riots broke out
throughout the capital Bogota. In the end, police and military forces were able to shoot and kill
Escobar, ultimately ending the Medellin cartel’s reign on December 2, 1993. The Cali cartel took
over the cocaine market, but by 1995 was overtaken by the Colombian government (Friman &
Andreas, 1999).
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The demise of the cartels did little to slow the production and supply of drugs; it merely
changed the structure of the business paradigm. The departure of the big drug lords brought with it
much less order in the drug world and more opportunity for newer, smaller enterprises to establish
themselves in the market (LeoGrande & Sharpe, 2000). Instead of two main cartels in Colombia,
there are now between 250 and 300 trafficking enterprises that are much smaller, enclosed and
secretive than the cartels before them (López et al., 2001, p. 24).
The paradigms these ventures utilize are an adaptation of those used by the cartels before
them. The continued crackdown on drug traffickers caused these new ventures to decentralize and
reduce their size allowing much more flexibility for the changing environment (Vellinga, 2004).
The large, visible size of the cartels was a significant part of their undoing, which the new
ventures recognized and thus corrected. Operating as smaller, more disconnected cells has allowed
these new ventures to collaborate much more effectively with a variety of partners that specialize
in certain areas. One criminal organization may be specialized in production while another may be
more efficient in distribution; the new ventures partner with the most specialized (Germain, 2010).
In addition, they directly injected themselves into the international market to establish new
distribution channels as well as enter new markets (Lopez et al., 2001). The chart below compares
the paradigms of the old and new illicit ventures:
Paradigm

Old Illicit Venture

New Illicit Venture

Brand Reputation
Visibility to the public

Yes
Yes
No, not past Central and North
America
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Yes
No

International channels
Efficient distribution channels
Supplier relations
Political lobbying/participation
Human resources
Quality control
Research and Development
Corporate Social Responsibility
Centralized Structure
Partnerships
Customer relationship management
Bribery

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes, less visible though

Specifically, as the United States pushed through with its war on drugs, many of the old
trafficking routes through the Caribbean and Latin America became heavily guarded. Because of
this intensification of border control and political pressure on eradicating drugs, the new drug
ventures needed to diversify their transit routes and form a new strategy to supply the United
States. These illicit ventures’ new size and flexibility made it possible to expand internationally
into countries like Guinea Bissau and establish themselves there for easier entrance into another
large market, Europe (Rodas, 2013). Additionally, the need to continue supplying the United
States forced many of these enterprises to partner with Mexican cartels, since NAFTA allowed

9

easier trade across borders. The importance and success of this partnership with Mexican cartels
cannot be overstated. Approximately 93 percent of cocaine leaving South America for the United
States now travels through Mexico (Perkins and Placido, 2010, para. 10). The image below depicts
the routes of cocaine traffic from Colombia that goes through Mexico:

Source: Canales, Rodrigo. 2013. The
deadly genius of drug cartels. Ted Talk, October 2013.
http://www.ted.com/talks/rodrigo_canales_the_deadly_genius_of_drug_cartels.html

In response to this increase in the amount of cocaine traveling across borders, many
initiatives have been put in place to monitor the movement. This has forced many of these
ventures to export small amounts and reduce the risk of their load being seized across the border.
The ventures have altered their transportation system to be multi-stage rather than one step
transportation like the cartels before them. The sheer amount of goods, both licit and illicit,
flowing between the borders made it extremely difficult for border officials to find the small, but
frequent shipments exported by these new ventures (Dermota, 1999; Perkins and Placido, 2010;
Zabludoff, 1997).
The smaller size of these ventures allowed the business to extend itself into Colombian
society. The size of the old ventures provided a large enough internal network that could provide
them with the resources they required. Transportation, production, and distribution were usually
done by their periphery network allowing them to rely less on outside resources. As these ventures
decreased in size, much of the services they needed were no longer available within the
organization, so they looked to the community to provide those services. When the drug cartels
disbanded, many small businesses working with the cartels lost their power both economically and
politically. This faction of small businesses within society thus accepted this new paradigm and
many of these same legal businesses became subcontractors for these ventures, thereby allowing
the drug ventures to become decentralized and further expand among society. As mentioned
earlier, transportation, legal services, investment consulting, and money laundering were services
needed by these new ventures. Society began to accept the expansion of this industry into society
and was able and willing to provide these services (Vellinga, 2004).
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Today, the drug ventures continue their expansion throughout Colombia, with
paramilitaries becoming much more involved in the production of the coca plant. The guerrilla’s
military chain of command structure has greatly aided in their success in the industry, with clear
promotion paths and clear authority figures (Canales, 2013). Their protection of coca fields will
cause Colombia to miss their 2013 target of eradicating 135,000 hectares of coca by a considerable
margin. The guerrillas have been known to shoot down aerial spray planes, set booby traps for
manual eradicators, and pressure communities into obstructing access to the fields (Parkinson,
2013). This guerrilla protection allows these new ventures to diversify their portfolio and broaden
their reach into Colombian life; they now participate in extortion, illegal gold mining, micro
trafficking, gambling, and marijuana dealing in Colombian cities (McDermott, 2013).
The illicit paradigm as found in Mexico
To fully develop a clear picture of the operations of drug ventures, it is imperative to look at the
country of Mexico and, in particular, the Sinaloa cartel. The Mexican experience is quite similar to
that of Colombia, only with a more recent entrance into the drug trade. Once NAFTA was
established in 1994, the floodgates opened for drug trafficking in Mexico. Many entrepreneurs in
Mexico recognized the opportunity in working with Colombian producers of cocaine and
exploited it. These ventures had previously been exporting marijuana and smaller amounts of
cocaine, but by the mid 1990s they had begun to export 75-85 percent of the cocaine into the
United States (Gootenberg, 2011, p. 9). The United States Drug Enforcement Administration
estimates that Mexico earned more than $30 billion in revenue in 1994, the same year that
NAFTA was signed (Andreas, 1998, p. 160). Mexico’s origin in the drug trade stems from similar
sources as Colombia. The drug trade flourished in Mexico due to the lack of economic
opportunity, widespread inequality among rural regions, and poor state management.
Political, social, and economic dimensions
There have been high levels of inequality amongst rural populations with little opportunity for
legal employment and high migration out of these towns. An ethnographic study that was done by
James McDonald (2005) in a small, rural Mexican town of 10,000 people shows the extent to
which the drug trade has affected many rural people. Like many rural communities in Colombia,
the town had historically relied on agricultural for their livelihoods. However, the onset of
globalization made it difficult for these communities to keep up, which led to widespread
unemployment, displacement, and migration. The result was devastating: dramatic inequality
(McDonald, 2005).
This industry generated jobs for these communities both indirectly and directly; it provided
an “underground exit option” for those that had limited employment options in the legal economy.
Currently, there is an estimated 300,000 people in Mexico purely growing drug crops, which does
not include the other services these drug ventures employ (Andreas, 1998). Politically, the drug
trade has been able to exploit the weaknesses of the state, which has allowed the industry to
flourish. It is estimated that Mexican cocaine traffickers spend $500 million a year on bribes. The
ventures also take advantage of the poor state management that is prevalent throughout much of
Mexico (Andreas, 1998, p. 163).
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The business paradigms of the Sinaloa Cartel
Operating as one of the largest and most powerful illicit organizations in the western hemisphere,
the Sinaloa cartel enjoys a $3 billion yearly revenue, which is comparable to the earnings of
Facebook. Their reach is global, with operations in over twelve countries but remains highly
flexible (Keefe, 2012). Their global operation structure and organization resembles many of the
paradigms that large multinational corporations use. The cartel controls a large amount of territory
along the U.S.-Mexican border, which they defend violently (“Insight Crime”, 2012). The large
amount of territory requires strong leadership and networks to maintain and protect their control.
The Treasury Department has described the leader of the Sinaloa cartel, Joaquin “El
Chapo” Guzman, as the world’s most powerful drug trafficker. In order to protect the powerful El
Chapo, the organizational structure of the cartel and the networks are designed accordingly. There
is no count on the number of people working for the cartel, including those subcontracted by the
cartel. Police and border officials have been known to work closely with the cartel, providing it
with eyes and ears in many different social and political arenas. It was exposed in early 2010 by a
former police officer working for Sinaloa that the cartel had the entire Mexican police force on its
payroll. The cartel also pays civilian lookouts $100 a month just to monitor border inspections and
police convoys (Keefe, 2012). Sinaloa recently partnered with the Gulf cartel, La Familia
Michoacana, and Tijuana cartel, which has provided the cartel with an even larger network
throughout Mexico (“Insight Crime”, 2012).
Similar to a legal business, Sinaloa is very conscious of their brand reputation and its
impact on the cartel’s operations. The cartel has built up a brand of professionalism, innovation,
and business savvy that Sinaloa strives to protect (Canales, 2013). The cartel can be exceedingly
brutal and violent, but they are also very conscious about the consequences of excessive violence.
Violence is used strategically for intimidation, but will never be overused. This pragmatic
approach to the use of violence has allowed Sinaloa to cultivate necessary relationships with
communities and protect the cartel’s brand (Keefe, 2012).
Additionally, the cartel has been regarded as one of the most innovative in the industry due
in large part to El Chapo’s many contributions. Perhaps one of the most prominent innovations
that El Chapo developed was a tunnel between the United States and Mexico. This underground
passageway provided the cartel with heightened access to their largest market. After the tunnel
was discovered, El Chapo developed a new approach of shipping canned goods full of cocaine
from Guadalajara to Mexican owned grocery stores in California. This strategic and frequent
innovation has allowed the cartel to stay ahead of competition, often being a first mover in new
markets. The cartel has begun selling cocaine to Australia while also exploring opportunities in
Southeast Asia, Japan, and China (Keefe, 2012).
The role of large cartels like Sinaloa in the Mexican experience provides an interesting
comparison to the discussion on Colombian illicit ventures. However different these illicit
ventures are in terms of size and global prowess, Mexican cartels utilize business paradigms that
are not only similar to those of large legal corporations, but are also characterized by the internal
and external factors of Mexico. By looking further at the impact of the Colombian political, social,
and economic dimensions on illicit ventures, we can identify the characteristics of Colombia that
impact and shape the business paradigms of these ventures.
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The role of the state in shaping illicit ventures
Throughout the course of Colombia’s drug trafficking history, the role of the state in the growth
and progression of these illicit ventures is quite prevalent. As the drug industry has grown through
the integration of the industry into the political landscape, the state has become more and more
dependent on the profits generated from such a lucrative industry. As the United States and other
countries initiated a war on drugs, external political pressure has forced the Colombian state to
reduce the visibility of its activities in aiding illicit ventures, which shapes the business paradigms
of the smaller drug ventures seen in Colombia today.
Since the beginning of the cocaine industry in Colombia in the 1980s, the state has
tolerated the industry with little intervention or control, which has allowed drug traffickers to
exploit weak institutions (Hartlyn, 1993). Thoumi (2005) and Hartlyn (1993) assert that the initial
belief about the industry was that it had very few perceived negative effects; the huge economic
boom of the drug trade initially brought with it relief from Colombia’s chronic foreign exchange
scarcity. As discussed previously, money and foreign exchange from the drug trade was injected
into a stagnant economy, causing many citizens and governmental officials to view the drug trade
as a positive and welcome change.
As illicit ventures integrated themselves into the system, Colombia has become
increasingly dependent on these ventures due to the number of benefits the country receives
(Hartlyn, 1993). The way the state is politically structured and the lack of campaign finance
controls greatly aided the infiltration of illicit money entering the political process (Hartlyn, 1993;
Thoumi, 2005). Many governmental officials benefit from the bribery and the corruption
associated with the state’s dealings with the drug traffickers. Illicit ventures produce larger bribes
for governmental officials and law enforcement officers in response to increased outside pressure
put on countries to halt these ventures (Andreas, 1998). In Mexico, it was estimated that in 1996,
70-80 percent of the judicial police force were corrupt. Of the 270 corrupt employees fired by the
attorney general that same year, many were merely rehired in other parts of Mexico or reinstated
after challenging their firing in court (Andreas, 1998, p.164).
Changes in the political landscape in the 1990s greatly aided in shaping the smaller drug
ventures seen today. As discussed earlier, the war on drugs in the United States brought with it a
crackdown on drug shipments arriving in Florida by way of the Caribbean, which forced many
drug ventures to change their routes (Dermota, 1999). With this constant attack and changing
international policies, these enterprises needed to adapt to survive and sought new ways to
continue to deliver their product to the United States markets (Kurrle, 2013). After the
implementation of NAFTA, the decision to begin shipping through Mexico to the United States
was an easy one. The illicit ventures need to be more nimble and willing to transport smaller
shipments to get past heightened security on the Mexican border. As this security increased, the
need to bribe officials and government officials increased, which also increased the state’s
dependency on these ventures’ success (Dermota, 1999). In Mexico alone, it is estimated that as
much as $30 billion a year is being laundered for the drug trade, with 10 percent of that being used
for law enforcement, military, and political payoffs (Eskridge, 2001).
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As the suppression of the drug trade continued, outside political pressure forced the
Colombian government to be less visible in its activity with drug traffickers. The state’s
cooperation with paramilitaries made this invisibility possible. The involvement of the
paramilitary in drug trafficking is extensive, with much of the paramilitaries’ income generated
from various activities within the drug trade (Hristov, 2009). This includes using extreme violence
to protect inputs, production sites, and labs (Salazar & Fierro, 1993). In 2002, there was a secret
negotiation between paramilitaries and the Colombian state, which ended in the incorporation of
the paramilitary into the state and economy. This relationship has enabled the state to “conceal its
role and evade responsibility for crimes by entrusting much of the dirty work to armed civilian
groups which operate under the clandestine coordination of the army and the police” (Hristov,
2009, p. 14). The governmental tie to paramilitaries only increased; by mid-2008, over 40 percent
of Congress members were found to have close ties to paramilitaries (Hristov, 2009, p. 15).
Paramilitaries provided the apparatus in which to hide the state’s role within drug trafficking.
Under the Uribe administration from 2002 to 2010, coca cultivation actually increased throughout
much of his term. The graph below depicts the lack of state control over, or the possible state ties
to, the cultivation of coca:

Source: Brittain, Prof. James J. “Colombia and America’s War on Drugs.” Global Research, November 30, 2009.
Accessed December 14, 2013. http://www.globalresearch.ca/colombia-and-america-s-war-on-drugs

As the states role became less visible through their relationship with paramilitaries, the
ventures were still able to exploit the government and continue to cultivate coca. If these new
ventures were any larger or more visible, they would not be able to benefit from their relationship
with the government and the paramilitaries, which would harm their ability to produce and
distribute cocaine (Vellinga, 2004).
The effects of illicit ventures on the state
Not only has corruption and bribery left citizens with little faith in the ethics of their government,
but it also has led to the government’s loss of legitimacy and an inability to protect their citizens’
human, labor, or legal rights that Colombian’s are constitutionally guaranteed. The country has
been able to maintain its democracy even with the drug trade’s presence, with free elections, a
resilient Constitution, and a well-developed judicial system. However, the state remains weak,

14

offering little protection of its citizens’ rights (Brysk, 2009). Similarly, Guinea Bissau’s drug
trafficker-tainted government remains irrelevant to many citizens as it completely lacks basic
functions and fails to produce any benefits for its citizens (Kohnert, 2010).
This was seen in the country of Guinea Bissau, as government officials and traffickers
entered into what was seen as a mutually beneficial relationship, allowing traffickers to operate
freely in the country (Bybee, 2011). Guinea Bissau was the most enticing of countries for the new
ventures due to the poor, uneducated population and the country’s lack of natural resources. The
unprotected and unpoliced coastline and ninety islands, allowed easy exploitation by the drug
ventures. Corruption further aided in the development of the relationship between the military elite
and the drug ventures allowing access to key ports, airstrips, and human capital needed to
transport the product (Rodas, 2013; Zeidler, 2011). By expanding into these new countries for
transshipment, the ventures are able to diversify their supplier points, invest in other economies,
and utilize a new, desperate population and government (Thoumi & Windybank, 2007).
By the early 1990s, attempts to destroy the drug trade in Colombia had led to the beginning
of eradication campaigns as suggested by the United States. In an effort to save their livelihood,
many growers lobbied their government for legalization rather than eradication. The government
did not listen and with further outside political pressure began to eradicate crops. This displaced
many growers as they watched their livelihood burn before their eyes and were unable to replant
anything on their now barren land. Left with no other alternatives, many guerrilla groups found
new recruits among the displaced farmers adding to the strength and size of these violent groups
(Friman & Andreas, 1999; LeoGrande & Sharpe, 2000). The eradication campaign only fueled a
larger distrust in the government that these guerrilla groups and drug traffickers were able to take
advantage of.
In the face of such violence, turmoil and displacement, Colombians have the right to
expect security and protection from their government (McLean, 2002). However, the
government’s attempt to disintegrate the cartels in the late 1980s left over a thousand people dead,
including 500 police, 40 judges, and 500 civilians (LeoGrande & Sharpe, 2000; Singer, 2008). The
violence only continued as the government and smaller enterprises continued to use paramilitaries
and guerrilla groups to aid in the drug trade. In 2002 alone, the number of human rights violations
and displacement of Colombian people was staggering: 373,020 Colombians were displaced,
2,986 kidnapped, 500 ‘disappeared’, and 4,000 killed as a result of political conflict (Holmes et
al., 2006, p. 13). Paramilitaries account for over 80 percent of these human rights violations even
after the state declared them illegal in 1989 (Holmes et al., p. 13). The participation of the
guerrillas in the drug trade has proved to be a huge source of funding for the guerrillas, which has
made it extremely difficult for the government to come to a peace agreement with them. The
inability of the government to effectively manage the state and protect its citizens has caused the
loss of the legitimacy of the government. However, in the past few months, the government has
begun to establish a peace agreement with the guerrillas and regain some control over the state
(Neuman, 2013).
In the last month, the government has been able to make movement towards accomplishing
a peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group by
establishing a framework for FARC to participate in the political process. The guerrilla group has
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not yet ceased warfare or put down its weapons, but if a full peace deal is completed, the guerrillas
could possibly establish a political party and run candidates in elections. This would be a huge
step in helping to stop the extreme violence that is still prevalent throughout Colombia (Neuman,
2013). In an effort to influence these peace talks to advocate for societal and economic rights, 150
illicit crop growers in Colombia met last week in Bogota to advocate for their human rights. It is
their hope that the solutions reached will also be solutions for those whose livelihood depends on
the illicit crops. They want the solutions to be all encompassing rather than just to solve the
violence between the government and the paramilitaries (Volckhausen, 2013).
The role of society in shaping illicit ventures
As the shift occurred in the business paradigm in illicit ventures in 1991, there was a coinciding
shift in society’s attitudes towards the drug industry. This shift in attitude toward the drug
industry, along with the Colombian culture, ultimately shaped both the cartel’s business paradigm
as well as the new illicit business paradigm today.
Historically, Colombia has had difficulty establishing a common national identity that each
region can share and take pride in. As mentioned above, the extreme regions within Colombia’s
geography made it difficult for a social structure to be established that allowed upward social
mobility throughout the country (Vellinga, 2004). With the introduction of the coca trade in the
Andean region, much of their culture and traditional way of life is now intertwined with the coca
plant and the trading of it (Morales, 1986). As the constructivist theory suggests, the history of La
Violencia has made it difficult for Colombians to break the norm of internal violence formed
during that time (Millet, 2002; Thoumi, 2005).
La Violencia destroyed social capital in Colombia, leaving the country with an
individualistic society (Brysk, 2009). Instead of a collective identity that some nations share,
Colombian culture promotes individuals seizing opportunities that will most benefit them as an
individual. As the drug cartels began to seize power in Colombia, individuals acted upon their own
self interest in joining an industry that did more harm to the collective (Thoumi, 2005).
Colombians began to legitimize the drug industry and the employment they had within it.
Constructivists would say that Colombians began to accept the violence and the industry as social
norms due to country’s violent past (Webb et al., 2009). The drug industry allowed them the
upward social mobility that their social structure had been lacking, creating a new emerging
middle class (Hartlyn 1993; Lopez et al., 2001). This mobility and success through the drug
industry ultimately provided the societal and community acceptance that these illicit ventures
needed to grow.
The relationship between the community and an illicit venture is extremely significant.
Without communities viewing this business as legitimate, many drug enterprises would fail. The
ventures can provide the community with protection, employment, and public goods, such as
neighborhood improvement and the soccer fields that Pablo Escobar built for the poorest section
of his neighborhood (Brice, 2003; Zimbalist et al., 2010). Even after Pablo Escobar was dead, the
poor went to his funeral because they had admired and respected him, regardless of the number of
people he had assassinated and terrorized for the growth of his business. Escobar was there for his
community in a way that the government was not able or willing to be (Zimbalist et al., 2010).
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However, as the violence and control that these cartels had over society increased, they
soon began to lose the legitimacy and community acceptance that they had previously enjoyed.
The industry still provided a livelihood to many, but the negative effects of displacement, guerrilla
and paramilitary involvement, and government corruption was not accepted any longer (Lopez et
al., 2001). In 1997, half of Colombia’s registered voters (10 million people) voted for a peace
referendum that called for a peace talk between the guerrillas and the government (LeoGrande &
Sharpe, 2000, p. 9). This shift in attitude towards the industry ultimately established new norms
and social rules that the new business paradigm sought to follow. As society began to push back in
response to many of the negative aspects of the industry, these new ventures adapted (Lopez et al.,
2001). Many of the smaller illicit ventures today now seek this same acceptance from their
community and society by assimilating into society and taking with them lessons learned from
their predecessors (Lopez et al., 2001; Vellinga, 2004). Because these ventures require the
acceptance of their community to operate and legitimize their activity, the smaller structure aids
their business in becoming a more accepted feature in the community. Their size reduces their
network strength so the community provides the resources these ventures need to continue to
operate. With the community’s acceptance of their business, the ventures can effectively utilize
the networks in society (Vellinga, 2004).
The social effects of illicit ventures
In addition to the lack of trust in the government, the drug trade left many Colombians fearing
those around them, which resulted in a complete lack of solidarity and trust, and a weakened sense
of a national identity (Hartlyn, 1993; Thoumi & Windybank, 2007). Everyday exchanges between
citizens were approached with caution and a certain level of distrust. Media feared for their lives if
they were reporting on drug activities (Hartlyn, 1993). Listed as the fourth most deadly country for
reporters, Mexican media has experienced a similar gripping effect. One newspaper even devoted
an entire front page as a plea for peace with the drug cartels (Khan, 2013). With so many violent
deaths and crimes taking place in communities, Colombians are never certain who was carrying
out the crimes so they suspect everyone (McLean, 2002). There has been an increased level of
pessimism that has greatly impacted the values of the Colombian people and changed the nature of
their society (Hartlyn, 1993). Colombians once believed the industry would positively change
their lives and bring about financial success. However, this view quickly changed to a more
pessimistic view of the industry that actually increased inequality, human rights violations, and
unemployment within their society.
The short-term benefits of the drug trade were quickly replaced with the long-term
negative effects. Certain groups experienced a much higher degree of success than others,
establishing deeper class systems than before. The huge profits from the industry accumulated at
the top, creating an emerging ‘narcobourgeoisie’ (Hartlyn, 1993; Salazar & Fierro, 1993). An
International Monetary Fund report examining 1995 statistics stated that the upper 20 percent of
households in Colombia earned 60 percent of the income while the lowest 20 percent earned 2
percent of the income in Colombia (Holmes et al., 2006, p. 10). While many initially believed that
the drug trade would bring financial prosperity, it merely drove the inequality farther apart.
Certain growing regions saw success, but the entire region did not experience the same economic
benefits. Only a few already involved and employed within the sector saw increased income
(Angrist & Kugler, 2008). The short-term relief that some regions saw was quickly replaced with
further inequality and joblessness (Holmes et al., 2006).
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The increase in unemployment was seen in many areas throughout Colombia, with an
increase to 20 percent in 2000 compared to a 7.5 percent unemployment rate in 1994 (Holmes et
al., 2006, p. 3). Research by Holmes et al. (2006) found that an increase in coca cultivation has
negative effects on long run employment. Trafficked items that require a significant amount of
human capital, such as drugs, displace products that are labor intensive. As a result, Colombian
employment in legal, labor-intensive industries are undermined. The coffee industry employs 12
percent, while the drug trade employs close to 7 percent of workers within Colombia (Holmes et
al., 2006, p. 7). Even those that were employed, mainly in coca growing regions, experienced a
lower standard of living than other Colombians. In 1995, there was a steep increase in the number
of violent deaths as well as a large increase in violence in coca cultivating regions (Angrist &
Kugler, 2008).
As discussed earlier, the violence that this industry unleashed on Colombia led to extreme
displacement and human rights violations. The lack of social infrastructure in Colombia provided
enough room for violent and predatory-like behavior to take place (Cardenas, 2007). With
Colombia’s lack of social capital, there has been opportunity for violence and crime to take hold
of their society. In 2001 alone, there was a rate of 73.3 per 1,000 people that experienced a violent
death in Colombia, compared to the 8.2 per 1,000 in the United States. In addition, more than
3,250 people per year have been kidnapped in Colombia since 1998 (McLean, 2002, p. 129). The
human rights violations along with the individualistic nature of Colombians make it extremely
difficult for society to establish a “collective identity around human rights” (Brysk, 2009, p. 41).
The violations are sporadically discussed and have quickly become a constructed norm within
society. There lacks a common narrative, collective cause, and legitimate leaders that can lead and
engage the Colombian people toward a solution for the extreme abuses the drug industry has
inflicted on society (Brysk, 2009).
The role of the economy in shaping illicit ventures
Colombia’s drug trade is worth around $10 billion, which represents 25 percent as much as the
legal exports for the country (Badkar, 2011, slide 2). In addition, the drug trade directly employs
300,000 people, or 3 percent of the Colombian workforce (Podur, 2003, para. 5), while in Latin
America 2.5 to 2.7 million people are employed in the production and sales of drugs (Salazar &
Fierro, 1993). For Colombia, drug cultivation represents 6.7 percent of agricultural production,
whereas coffee is 12 percent (Podur, 2003, para. 5). Drug traffickers know that the state and its
people heavily rely on this industry for economic purposes. Any change in the way that the
industry is treated could have a devastating effect on their profits and thus Colombia’s economy
(Podur, 2003). The number of years the drug trade has flourished in Colombia has caused it to
become immensely integrated within the Colombian state and economy. This has centralized the
drug trade in the state, which has directed a large portion of drug money into the economy
(Meehan, 2011). The little progress the state has made in diversifying the economy or creating
opportunities for rural citizens to find new employment has made some parts of society much
more willing to take part in the drug trade. This provides these new ventures with an ample supply
of employees and sub-contractors that they can easily access within their community (Salazar &
Fierro, 1993).
In the effort to remove all barriers for free trade through agreements like NAFTA,
international governments inadvertently removed barriers for illicit trade as well. With free trade
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between Mexico and the United States, many of the new small illicit ventures looked to transport
their goods through the Mexican border rather than the Caribbean. As previously discussed, many
of the trade routes to the United States from Colombia became more heavily guarded, but with
NAFTA there was a much easier route to access the United States (Rodas, 2013; Singer, 2008).
The agreement increased the amount of trade between the two countries, providing more of an
opportunity for illicit ventures to conceal illicit products among legal products being traded.
Border patrol is searching for a needle in continuously new haystacks. In response to this
increased economic globalization, these new illicit ventures were willing to export much smaller
amounts to get past the detection of border officials, often using a small shipment to distract from
a much larger one (Dermota, 1999; Williams, 1998). They wanted to remain undetected by law
enforcement, which shaped their shipment sizes, transportation methods, partnerships with
Mexican cartels, and routes.
The economic effects of illicit ventures
The more profit these illicit ventures make, the more integrated and influential they became in the
state’s economy. Many states with an active illicit economy has seen its GDP, productivity, and
legal businesses become dependent on the illicit ventures’ investment in the state’s economy. The
growth and composition of the GDP are greatly impacted by the economy’s integration with the
drug trade. In Colombia, the GDP fell significantly in the 1980s, down to 3.4 percent from 5.8
percent in the 1970s (Cardenas, 2007, p.4). Unlike other countries in the region, Colombia saw an
even larger GDP growth rate decline to 0.9 percent per year in the 1990s (Cardenas, 2007, p. 4). In
1982, the drug trade made up 6.07 percent of the Colombia’s GDP (Hartlyn, 1993, p. 9). For
countries like Guinea Bissau, a single drug transaction can account for a large portion of the
state’s GDP (Rodas, 2013). The drug trade represents a huge segment of the GDP that goes
unrecorded in most national income statistics, making it difficult for countries to accurately
represent the true state of their economy. However, in 2000, Colombia began to include the
production of illegal drug crops in their GDP calculations, as it is such a large economic activity
(Fleming et al., 2000).
The impact of drug ventures’ money in the economy can be illustrated through the
presidential campaign of Ernesto Zedillo in 1994 in Mexico. Zedillo openly supported reforms in
the country that would completely disrupt drug trafficking operations. The heads of illicit drug
enterprises became worried he would follow through on his reforms and opted to withdraw their
money out the Mexican economy. This destabilized the entire Mexican economic structure,
affecting Mexico’s international fiscal position and its ability to pay its foreign debt. In response,
political candidates backed off, allowing the kingpins to reinvest their money in the Mexican
economy and stabilizing the economy (Eskridge, 2001). Colombia greatly relies on this industry
and these ventures for state revenue, which causes the perpetuation of the industry and draws on
concerns about economic stability (Andreas, 1998).
Legal businesses within Colombia have historically been enveloped and integrated with the
drug industry, increasing the dependence the country’s economy has on the trade. Many business
fronts act as legal businesses, while others are formed and run with the profits earned in the drug
trade. As mentioned previously, the Cali trade built and operated a chain of 432 drugstores, owned
hotels, supermarkets, airlines, bank institutions, radio stations, and soccer clubs (Vellinga, 2004).
These ventures use the profits they make through illicit ventures to start and invest in licit ventures
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that society and the economy depends on for growth (Carter, 1994). The economy benefits from
huge investment in legitimate enterprises from the profits earned in the illicit drug trade and the
ventures that invest their money into the economy.
Conversely, many Colombians see drug production as a sound investment with significant
gains, causing a lack of investment by Colombians in licit business (Holmes et al., 2006). Foreign
investors are also hesitant in investing in Colombian business, reducing possible foreign direct
investment that Colombia could be receiving without the drug trade presence. The United States’
war on drugs prompted a new foreign policy that provided “certification” for countries that the
U.S. considered allies in the war on drugs. A certification meant that the country would continue
receiving nonmilitary aid, U.S. representatives of multi-lateral banks would continue to vote for
proposals from that country, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation would insure new
investments in that country. In 1998, Colombia was decertified for the second year in a row by the
United States. Because of this, there was a significant stagnation in foreign investment in
Colombia, hurting the legitimate part of the economy. Colombian industries such as shrimp and
flowers, the very industries that the United States tried to encourage through trade, were greatly
impacted by the restrictions this decision implemented. (Dermota, 1999).
In addition, the drug trade diverts capital and labor from these legitimate industries that
could add strength and stability to the state’s economy. As the industry expanded through the
1980s and 1990s, the need for labor greatly increased. The huge profits earned in this industry
attracted huge numbers of people to work for these illicit ventures, causing a diversion of labor
from legitimate industries and a productivity implosion within Colombia (Cardenas, 2007;
LeoGrande & Sharpe, 2000).
The interconnectedness of the dimensions and its impact on developing a solution
The way in which these dimensions interact with one another provides further explanation as to
the how illicit business paradigms greatly resemble those of legal businesses. Colombia and its
illicit ventures are characterized by these particular external and internal factors, so it is beneficial
to explore how these dimensions are shaped by one another and how this impacts the business
paradigms.
For many rural societies in Colombia, there was an extreme lack of legal economic
opportunities provided both before and during the drug trade. Their view of the drug trade initially
was that it brought forth economic opportunity and livelihood for their family. The drug ventures
were able to take advantage of this lack of economic freedom and provide many of these
communities with not only money for their families but also public goods such as housing and
soccer fields. The lack of opportunity in the legal economic sector caused many to accept jobs in
the illicit drug ventures. Industries within the legal economy were harmed by this diversion of
labor and capital, which ultimately stunted the growth of Colombia’s economy.
The little growth seen in the legal economy ultimately continued the dependence that
society had on the illicit economy. This made it difficult for the government to gain public support
for eradicating the drug trade. As the government struggled to find ways in which to impact the
influence of the drug trade, many officials began to accept bribes out of fear and greed. Bribery
and corruption began to overtake many of the decisions made by the government, causing a
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decrease in state legitimacy among Colombians. This loss of legitimacy made it difficult for many
governmental figures to distinguish themselves from the drug trade, making it even more difficult
to gain public support.
It is this interconnectedness among the social, political, and economic dimensions that has
made it difficult to clearly identify a solution to ending the drug trade in Colombia. Each
dimension shapes the other, making it complex to find a solution that does not cause unneeded
harm to the country. However, if people began to look at these traffickers as businesses rather than
simple, violent organizations, it would be a much more useful approach to finding a solution.
These ventures operate within countries as any large, multinational corporation would and adapt to
the same shifts that legal businesses do. A much more useful solution could be developed if the
narrative surrounding these cartels changed and became one that accepted the idea that cartels are
businesses. The chart below compares the new illicit venture paradigms to that of a legal venture:
Paradigm
New Illicit Venture
Legal Venture
Brand Reputation

Yes

Yes

International channels

Yes

Yes

Efficient distribution channels

Yes

Yes

Supplier relations

Yes

Yes

Political lobbying/participation

No

Yes

Human resources

Yes

Yes

Quality control

Yes

Yes

Research and Development

Yes

Yes

Corporate Social Responsibility

Yes

Yes

Centralized Structure

No

Varies

Partnerships

Yes

Yes

Customer relationship management

Yes
Yes, less visible though than
old

Yes

Bribery

No

These ventures are not perfectly compared to a legal business, as their illicit product
determines which paradigms they can effectively implement. However, there is still a striking
similarity between illicit ventures and legal businesses. Whether the venture is a small,
decentralized venture like those recently established in Colombia or a large cartel like the old
cartels in Colombia or the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico, the illicit ventures model much of their
strategy and organization off of legal business practices. The internal and external environment
that characterizes both of these countries varies in comparison to one another. However, this
variance in the social, political, and economic dimensions is what shapes the paradigms of the
drug trafficking ventures. These illicit ventures have become increasingly similar to legal
businesses, which, through a change in narrative, could establish a much more useful and
appropriate solution to eradicating the drug trade.
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Conclusion
Depicted as simple minded, gun bearing goons that spread violence and corruption in the countries
they operate in, drug trafficking organizations have been surrounded by a narrative that obviously
lacks a full understanding of these ventures. Many neglect to understand the very basic aim of
these ventures: to fulfill the demand of over 230 million drug users worldwide. To fulfill this
demand, these ventures utilize many of the same paradigms are used by legal businesses. Many
make revenues that are comparable to legal multinational companies, which are often the same
companies that these illicit ventures model their organizational structure and leadership paradigms
after. These paradigms shift according to the external and internal environment of the countries
that these illicit ventures operate in. I explored the social, economic, and political factors that
shaped the shift to the new business paradigms seen in these new illicit ventures.
Through my analysis, I found that there are several internal and external factors that have
shaped the paradigms. Internally, the dependence of the Colombian government on the drug trade,
the nature of the Colombian culture, the social acceptance of the industry, and the lack of ample
opportunities in the legal economy form the paradigms of illicit drug ventures. External forces of
economic globalization and increased foreign political pressure also play a part in shaping illicit
business paradigms. As the illicit ventures continue to grow and develop in Colombia, they
become increasingly more integrated in society, the political landscape, and the economy. As these
changes take place internally and externally, the illicit business paradigms are shaped accordingly.
Through the examination of both the Colombian and Mexican experiences, I conclude that
these internal and external factors have shaped a new illicit business paradigm that greatly shares
many similarities of legal business paradigms. In countries that are characterized by these
particular external and internal factors, illicit ventures are in fact very similar to legal businesses.
By altering the narrative that currently surrounds these ventures, it would be much more effective
in determining the best approach to slow the growth of the drug trade. These ventures are complex
and integrated businesses that must be treated as such.
It could be beneficial to further research the effect that drug legalization laws have on the
drug industry. Legalization would effectively place these once illicit businesses into the legal
economy, providing these businesses with formal institutions and boundaries. They would be
treated just as any other large multinational business would be treated. Additionally, taking the
illicit nature out of their product may make it less of a desirable and profitable trade. Another area
of further research could be determining the effectiveness that the expansion of drug treatment
facilities and options within the United States would have on slowing the growth of the drug trade.
By stemming the demand for drugs, there would be much less opportunity for the expansion of
these illicit ventures. Many legal businesses fail due to a lack of demand for their product, which
could thus be the same for the illicit drug industry. As Pablo Escobar simply stated, “If there are
no consumers, there are no traffickers” (Dermota, 1999, p. 23).
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